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#2A-1/1V86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR RELATIONS. 
-- - -Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-83 45 
SUFFOLK COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES-WHITE COLLAR UNIT. 
Charging Party. 
ROGERS and CARTIER. P.C. (JAMES K. HOGAN. ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
•-, BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Suffolk 
County Association of Municipal Employees-White Collar Unit 
(Association) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
its charge against the County of Suffolk Department of Labor 
Relations (County). 
The charge, which was executed on October 2. 1985. 
alleges 
Some time in 1983. Jack Farneti. then Labor 
Relations Director, made a determination 
that Donald Gruen should not be in the 
Bargaining Unit 2. 
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It complains that this action of the County constitutes 
discrimination against an employee for an improper purpose, 
and therefore violates §209-a.l(b) of the Taylor Law. 
The Director dismissed the charge on the ground that it 
was not timely filed.— The Association argues that the 
Director did not give sufficient consideration to its 
allegation that from the time of Gruen's removal from the 
unit until mid-June 1985. it had been negotiating that matter 
with the County. It contends that these negotiations 
constituted an exhaustion of administrative remedies which 
was a precondition for the filing of the charge herein, and 
which therefore extended the time in which to file this 
charge. 
We affirm the decision of the Director. "The time to 
file a charge runs from the time when a charging party knows, 
or should have known, of the facts constituting the unlawful 
2/ 
conduct."— In New York City Transit Authority. 10 PERB 
1f3077 (1977). a charging party had argued that the time 
during which to file a charge does not begin to run until the 
charging party exhausts its contractual remedies. We 
rejected this argument, holding that a contractual grievance 
procedure cannot be analogized to an administrative 
1/Section 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure 
permits the filing of a charge within four months of the 
conduct complained about. 
2/Qnteora CSD. 16 PERB 1F3098 (1983) at p. 3163. 
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procedure. We stated that a grievance procedure is designed 
to protect private rights, while §209-a of the Taylor Law is 
designed to protect statutory rights, and that the two sets 
of rights do not always coincide. 
What we said about grievance procedures applies a 
fortiari to negotiations. Although it is an adjudicatory 
process, a contractual grievance procedure is not designed to 
provide a remedy for a statutory violation. Negotiation is 
not an adjudicatory process at all: rather, it is designed to 
facilitate accommodation where the parties differ as to what 
terms and conditions of employment ought to be. Accordingly, 
there is no basis for holding that negotiations extended the 
time during which the charge may have been filed. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and 
it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: January 14. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^w^^X^ 
David C. Randies, ^ Membei 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
#2B-l/U/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD. 
Respondent, 
and- CASE NO. -U~•&-!65 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD. 
Charging Party. 
CULLEN AND DYKEMAN. ESQS. (GERARD FISHBERG. ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
AXELROD. CORNACHIO & FAMIGHETTI. ESQS. (MICHAEL E. 
AXELROD. ESQ. of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Incorporated Village of Hempstead (Village) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that it violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by appointing a hearing officer 
to hear disciplinary charges that it preferred against a 
police officer represented by the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the Village of Hempstead (PBA). The ALJ 
determined that there was a past practice of disciplinary 
charges being heard by the Board of Trustees of the Village 
Board itself, and that the appointment of a hearing officer 
Board - U-8165 -2 
constituted a unilateral change of a term and condition of 
employment. 
The Village makes two arguments in support of its 
exceptions. The primary one is the advancement of a 
proposition of law. that its decision to appoint a hearing 
officer is not a mandatory subject of negotiation because, 
pursuant to State law. it is reserved to the discretion of 
the public employer. Its secondary argument is that the 
record does not support the ALJ's finding of a past practice. 
Dealing with the proposition of law first, we affirm the 
conclusion of the ALJ. As noted by the Village. §75 of the 
Civil Service Law provides that it is within the discretion 
of a public employer to hear a disciplinary charge itself or 
to appoint a hearing officer.— It does not follow, 
however, that because §75 gave the Village's Board of 
Trustees the discretion to hear a charge itself or to appoint 
a hearing officer, it may exercise that discretion 
unilaterally without violating §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law 
which obligates public employers to negotiate with respect to 
1/An unpublished decision of Justice Velsor at 
Special Term. Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. on July 21. 1985. 
in the instant disciplinary proceeding was authorized by 
§75 of the Civil Service Law. 
Board - U-8165 -3 
2/ 
mandatory subjects of negotiation.— The fact that but for 
the Taylor Law a decision would be left to the discretion of 
a public employer does not insulate it from mandatory 
negotiations. On the contrary, it is only where a public 
employer would otherwise have discretion to change a term and 
condition of employment that negotiations are mandated. 
Where a statute specifies a term and condition of employment, 
collective negotiations are preempted. 
This focuses attention on the question of whether 
employee discipline procedures constitute a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, a question long ago resolved by the courts. 
3/ In City of Auburn.- we held that a demand for variations 
from the disciplinary scheme set forth in §75 is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. While finding 
2/ln BOCES V. PERB. 82 A.D.2d 691. 14 PERB ir7025. 
7052 (1981), the Third Department, confirming a 
determination of this Board, said 
The duty to negotiate in good faith includes 
an obligation to continue past practices that 
involve mandatory subjects of negotiation, 
even in the absence of a provision to that 
effect in the contract. 
See also County of Onondaga v. PERB. 77 A.D.2d 783. 13 
PERB 1f7011 (1980) (4th Dept. 1980) and NLRB V. Katz. 
369 U.S.736(1962). 
1/10 PERB 1f3045 (1977). motion for reargument 
denied. 10 PERB 1f3060 (1977). 
Board - U-8165 -4 
. . 4/ 
discipline to be a term and condition of employment,- we 
nevertheless found it a prohibited subject of negotiation 
because of the preemptive effect of §§75 and 76 of the Civil 
Service Law. 
The courts reversed our determination that the subject 
of discipline is preempted by the Civil Service Law 
5/ provisions,— the Third Department saying, "disciplinary 
procedures are not per se prohibited subjects of collective 
bargaining." The effect of that holding is that disciplinary 
procedures, including procedures relating to the designation 
of hearing officers, are a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
As noted, it is a corollary to a public employer's duty 
to negotiate mandatory subjects of negotiation that it 
refrain from taking unilateral action with respect to them. 
Accordingly, if there is a past practice that no hearing 
officer be appointed in disciplinary charges involving 
employees represented by PBA. then the Village's conduct 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. This brings us to 
the Village's second argument. 
4/See City of Albany v. Helsby. 56 A.D.2d 976. 10 PERB ir7006 
(1977), in which the Third Department confirmed PERB's holding that 
discipline involves a term and condition of employment, and, 
consequently, a mandatory subject of negotiation. The question of 
n r f l o m n t l r t n V* a A rt/%t- K a f l n r a i e a r l nr» t h a t ^ a e a 
£ • J- ^ * W l l l £ ' W O . W & 2 . X J b l A U JLJLW l r J ^ W W J.4 J . « J . hJ W V^ A. Jk& (~ JLXtA V» V U U V • 
5/Auburn Police Local 195 v. Helsby. 10 PERB Y7016 (Alb. Co., 
1977). aff'd. 62 A.D.2d 12. 11 PERB ir7003 (3d Dept. 1978). aff'd on 
opinion of Appellate Division. 46 N.Y.2d 1034. 12 PERB 1f7006 (1979). 
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In pertinent part, the record herein consists of a short 
6 / 
stipulation of fact,- stating: 
4. On or about June 10, 1985, the Board of 
Trustees appointed an arbitrator from the 
panel of the American Arbitration Association 
as hearing officer. 
5 .—Other cases have beenheard by theBoard of 
Trustees. 
This language is ambiguous. PBA has argued that it implies 
that all disciplinary charges have been heard by the Board of 
Trustees, and that the number of such cases, as well as the 
variety of circumstances with which they dealt, is sufficient 
to establish a past practice. The ALJ was persuaded by this 
argument. The Village argues, however, that this language is 
consistent with the proposition that some of the cases have 
been heard by the Board of Trustees and that they are neither 
sufficient in number nor in the variety of circumstances to 
constitute a past practice. Instead, according to the 
Village, the stipulated facts are consistent with the 
proposition that the Board of Trustees exercises discretion 
on a case-by-case basis whether or not to appoint a hearing 
officer. 
Interpreting the stipulation most favorably to PBA, we 
could hold that the record raises a sufficient inference of a 
6/After meeting with the parties at a pre-hearing 
conference, the ALJ summarized her understanding of those 
facts not in dispute. The following language is from that 
summary. The parties had been given the opportunity to 
question its accuracy or completeness but neither party did 
so. 
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past practice under which cases are heard by the Board of 
Trustees itself so as to shift the burden of proof to the 
Village. Following this approach, we would find that the 
Village has presented no evidence to refute the evidence of 
such a past practice, and we would affirm the decision of the 
ALJ. Alternatively, we could interpret the stipulation most 
favorably to the Village and conclude that the evidence is 
not sufficient to establish such a past practice. Were we to 
do so, we would reverse the ALJ and dismiss the charge. 
Because of the ambiguity of the single relevant sentence in 
the stipulation, we decline to do either. Instead, as 
suggested by the Village's brief, we remand this matter to 
the ALJ to take further evidence regarding the issues of fact 
and to reach a new decision based upon those facts. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the matter herein be and 
it hereby is, remanded to the ALJ for 
further proceedings consistent herewith. 
DATED: January 14. 1986 
Albany, New York 
fJLA^h^cJ2^-^ 
Haro-td R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member / 
^ 
-j- A —^ C^3^isut~£i>i-<_sr 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member ^ 
#2C-1/1V86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 2. UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondent, 
and CASE NO% U-8G82 
SYLVIA ZEDLAR. 
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER. GENERAL COUNSEL, NEW YORK STATE 
UNITED TEACHERS (PAUL H. JANIS. ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
LLOYD SOMER. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Sylvia 
Zedlar to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing her charge 
against Local 2, United Federation of Teachers (UFT). The 
exceptions argue that the Director erred in dismissing four 
specifications alleging violations of UFT's duty of fair 
representation.-
The first specification is that UFT was grossly 
negligent or irresponsible in its representation of Zedlar at 
1/There are some indications in Zedlar's charge and 
supporting papers that she also alleged a violation of UFT's 
duty to negotiate in good faith. The Director ruled that no 
such charge could be entertained because the duty to negotiate 
^ is a reciprocal obligation of public employers and recognized }
 or certified employee organizations which is not owed to an 
individual. The exceptions do not address this issue. 
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an arbitration hearing held on November 13, 1984. She 
complains that UFT failed to call witnesses whom she had 
identified and whose testimony would have been helpful, that 
it did not introduce relevant documents, and that it failed 
to challenge perjured testimony. The Director dismissed this 
specification on the ground that the charge, having been 
filed on April 9, 1985, was not timely to the extent that it 
complains about events occurring before December 9. 1984. 
In her exceptions. Zedlar argues that the events of 
November 13. 1984 were part of a continuing course of conduct 
in that UFT had assured her that it would attempt to remedy 
the problem by moving to vacate an adverse arbitration 
award. In effect, she is arguing: 1) that subsequent events 
tolled the four-month limitation period, and 2) it should be 
tolled for equitable reasons because "a promissory estoppal 
argument is certainly germane to the instant issue." She 
does not cite any legal authority to support these positions, 
and we are not persuaded by them. Dealing with the first 
argument. Captain's Endowment Association, 10 PERB 1P034 
(1977). indicates that actions of a union subsequent to 
conduct which might constitute a violation of the union's 
duty of fair representation do not extend the period during 
which an individual ma'"' complain about the oricrinal conduct. 
As to the second argument. Zedlar's claim of assurance is 
based upon a statement allegedly made to her by the UFT field 
10113 
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representative at the time of the arbitration hearing that if 
the award should be unfavorable, one could go to court. The 
Director found this allegation insufficient to constitute an 
assurance that UFT would take the matter to court. We agree. 
The second specification is that UFT failed to inform 
Zedlar promptly of the arbitrator's award. Zedlar's papers 
show that UFT sent her the award on December 2. 1984. more 
than four months prior to her filing of the charge. 
Accordingly, the Director dismissed this specification as not 
being timely. He also indicated that he would have dismissed 
it on the merits in any event. Zedlar's papers show that UFT 
held the award about seven days before mailing it to Zedlar; 
the Director determined that this delay did not amount to 
gross negligence or irresponsibility. 
To the extent that the Director's decision is based on 
lack of timeliness. Zedlar's exceptions make the same 
argument as they did with respect to the first specification, 
and they are rejected for the same reasons. Insofar as the 
decision to dismiss the specification was on the merits. 
Zedlar requests that the Board undertake an investigation 
into whether she was treated in a different manner than other 
unit employees. She does not indicate that there is any 
reason for suspecting that her treatment was unusual in this 
regard. In any event, this proposal misapprehends this 
Board's role in connection with allegedly improper conduct. 
It affords parties a forum in which to litigate issues and 
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2/ decides cases on the basis of evidence presented to it; — 
it does not undertake investigations. 
The third specification is that UFT did not move, to 
vacate the arbitration award. Zedlar argues that UFT was 
obligated to do so because of its incompetent handling of the 
original arbitration. She also reiterates the equity-
argument: UFT assured her that it would do so; she relied on 
that assurance; therefore. UFT is obligated to perform in 
accordance with that assurance. 
As noted, the Director properly found Zedlar's 
allegations insufficient to constitute an assurance that UFT 
would move to vacate the arbitration award. He further ruled 
that even if an assurance had been given to Zedlar at the 
time of the arbitration hearing, it would not have been 
binding upon UFT once it received the award, because UFT 
would then have been free to make a judgment as to the 
likelihood of success of a court appeal. In this connection, 
he noted that Zedlar's papers show that UFT wrote to Zedlar 
on January 2, 1985, that there were no grounds to have the 
arbitration award vacated. 
We affirm this analysis of the Director. In State of 
New York (Diaz). 18 PERB 1f3047 (1985). we found a violation 
of the duty of fair representation in that the union was 
2/PERB's Rules of Procedure, Part 204. 
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irresponsible in its handling of its unit employee's 
grievance. Even so. we dismissed a separate charge alleging 
that the union's violation had obligated it to at least 
remain neutral with respect to his appeal of the arbitration 
3/ . 
award.— We found that the union did not act wrongfully 
in supporting the employer's opposition to a motion to 
vacate the arbitration award. A fortiari. a union is not 
obligated to support such a motion. 
The fourth specification is that UFT did not inform 
Zedlar that there was a 90-day period during which she 
herself could have brought a motion to vacate. The Director 
dismissed this specification on the ground that a union has 
no affirmative obligation to advise unit members regarding 
the possibility of. or procedures for. filing such a motion 
on their own. He noted that this presupposes that the union 
does not provide this information to some unit members on a 
discriminatory basis, but found no allegation of such 
discrimination. 
The exceptions merely reiterate Zedlar's position that 
UFT had an affirmative obligation to inform her of the 
90-day limitation. They do not state any legal basis for 
that position, and we find none. Finding no merit in 
Zedlar's exceptions, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
3,/Local 418 (Diaz). 16 PERB V3108 (1983). aff'd, Diaz 
v. PERB. A.D.2d . 18 PERB V7019 (3d Dept. 1985). 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: January 14. 198 6 
ATbany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
'^J-^fr^ 
David C. RandlesY Member 
#3A-l/H/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF COLONIE (DEPARTMENT OF 
PUBLIC WORKS). 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-298 6 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, IBT. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 294. IBT has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
10118 
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Unit: Included: Class I Operator. Class 2 Operator. 
Park Maintenance. 
Excluded: Foreman. Sanitation Supervisor and all 
other employees. 
Further.IT IS- ORDERED that the above named public-employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. IBT 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of. and 
administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: January 14. 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
^ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF SIDNEY. 
Employer, 
-and- - - - - CASENO.G-2995 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 693. INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local No. 693. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-2995 page 2 
Unit: Included: Employees employed in the following 
titles: Laborer; Motor Equipment 
Operator; Heavy Equipment Operator; 
Chief Wastewater Treatment Plant 
Operator; Wastewater Treatment Plant 
Operator; Building Maintenance 
Mechanic; Cleaner. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local No. 693. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs. Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the above unit, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: January 14. 1986 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUTCHESS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE. 
Employer, 
and- CASE-NO. G-2 9 8-3-
DUTCHESS UNITED EDUCATORS. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Dutchess United Educators 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All adjunct faculty. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Dutchess United Educators 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: January 14. 1986 
Albany, New York. 
T
""^old R. Newman. Chairman 
19123 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
E X E C U T I V E C H A M B E R 
A L B A N Y 12224 
MARIO M. C U O M O 
GOVERNOR 
December 10, 1985 
Dear Mr. Randies: 
It is with sincere regret that I accept your 
resignation as a Member of the New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board, effective January 31, 1986. 
I send you my personal thanks and those of the 
people of the State of New York for the time and energy 
you have devoted to the work of this important Board. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. David Randies 
P. 0. Box 500 
Clifton Park, New York 12065 
CLo^O *0^lf. C^Uy^^O 
